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Marx, Lenin and Pashukanis on Self-Determination: Reply to Robert Knox 
 
Bill Bowring, Professor of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London; practising 
barrister; International Secretary, Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers 
 
b.bowring@bbk.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
This response to Robert Knox’s very kind and constructive review of my 2008 book 
The Degradation of the International Legal Order?: The Rehabilitation of Law and 
the Possibility of Politics gives me the opportunity not only to answer some of his 
criticisms, but also, on the basis of my own reflections since 2008, to fill in some 
gaps. Indeed, to revise a number of my arguments. First, I re-state my attempt at a 
materialist account of human rights. Next I explain why for me the right of peoples to 
self-determination is absolutely central to a materialist understanding of human rights; 
and also fill a serious gap in my own account in the book. This leads me not only to a 
reply to Robert Knox on the question of ‘indeterminacy’ in international law, but also 
to a disagreement with him on the use or misuse of the language of self-
determination. My fourth section returns to our very different evaluations of the 
significance and meaning of the work of Yevgeny Pashukanis, and what, for me, is 
Pashukanis’ misunderstanding, for reasons consistent with his general theoretical 
trajectory, of Marx and Lenin on the Irish question. Finally, I present an outline of a 
re-evaluation of Marx’s principled position on self-determination. 
 
My book on international law and human rights appeared in 2008
1
. I have been very 
fortunate indeed, in that several reviewers have taken it seriously
2
. Robert Knox, who 
is himself a rising star of international legal theory, has provided a second searching 
and thoughtful critique which reflects a continuing and fruitful engagement between 
us – the first was on his Law and Disorder blog.3 I am therefore particularly grateful 
to the editors of Historical Materialism for this opportunity to respond to him. 
 
Symptomatic of the care with which Knox has read my book is his ready 
identification
4
 of my central project, which is a ‘substantive account of human rights’. 
This is intended by me to be a thoroughly materialist account of human rights, 
eliminating any reference to the transcendent or to any reliance on ‘human nature’, 
and located firmly in history, time and space.  
 
A materialist account of human rights 
 
A central element of my project is the identification, itself nothing new, of three 
generations of human rights, each with its inception in the revolutionary events of the 
1780s, of the years following 1917, and, especially of the great anti-colonial struggles 
of the Post World War II period. Each of these inspiring revolutionary events and the 
rights associated with it - the civil and political rights of the French Revolution, the 
social and economic rights of the Russian Revolution, and the third generation rights, 
crowned by the right of peoples to self-determination, and anti-colonial struggles - 
                                                 
1
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makes available to succeeding generations a ‘symbolic capital’ on which each may 
draw. In this way, the rights in question, at first glance no more than forms of words, 
mere rhetoric, acquire material force when mobilised in struggle. This is what I mean 
by ‘… their proper status as always scandalous, the product of, and constantly 
reanimated by, human struggle.’5 
I further maintain that human rights are not at all like civil and criminal law, which in 
various forms have existed (like religion) for as long as human civilisation, and which 
are to be found in codified or customary forms. There is a continuing debate, to which 
I have not yet contributed, as to whether constitutional law is also the product of 
defining historical moments and struggles. I have myself taught English constitutional 
law in the light of the relations between England and Ireland: the defining moments of 
English constitutional development map well onto the bloody attempts of England to 
colonise Ireland, and it is no accident that the presiding genius of constitutional theory 
in England was A. V. Dicey, a fervent opponent of Home Rule, and an energetic 
Unionist. 
International law also has a special status, with serious arguments, drawn from 
English positivism and international relations ‘realism’, as to whether there is any 
such thing. It is my contention that the international law to which Martti Koskenniemi 
referred as the ‘gentle civiliser of nations’6 or for an imagined and reactionary version 
of which Carl Schmitt had such nostalgia
7
, and of which the USSR had throughout its 
existence such a rigidly positivist account
8
, was thoroughly transformed in the post 
World War II period. The creation of the United Nations by the victorious powers – 
all permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of China were 
colonial powers at the time – was almost immediately subverted and transformed by 
the bloody and tumultuous anti-colonial struggles. This is why I refer in my first 
chapter to the right of peoples to self-determination as the revolutionary kernel of 
international law. 
It is my case that the working out of struggles for this right dominates the 
international agenda to this day. My examples in the book, drawn from practical 
experience, of the Kurds and the Chechens, are but two of a myriad all over the 
planet. 
Much of my book – incidentally, the sequence of chapters was re-ordered, and 
chapters were added and removed until a late stage – is devoted not only to a working 
out of my theses in relation to current events, but also to responses to some of the 
most cogent opposing positions, especially those of Habermas; of the post-modernists 
especially Douzinas; and of Badiou and Žižek, whose work I first drew on for its 
powerful attacks on contemporary human rights discourse. Knox is however quite 
right in noting my sympathy with Badiou’s political challenge, alongside and despite 
his complex ontology, in respect of which I do have reservations – for example, I 
reject Badiou’s critique of Spinoza, a topic for further work. 
 
 
International law and self-determination 
 
My disagreements with Knox begin where he explains my position on international 
law, and introduces my critique of Miéville and Pashukanis. My account of self-
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determination begins with Lenin’s profound and detailed polemic with Rosa 
Luxemburg and others, in a series of extended articles written before World War I
9
. In 
short, Lenin’s principled position, put into practice by him following 1917, and the 
subject matter of his final struggle with Stalin, graphically analysed by the late Moshe 
Lewin, is for me very much alive. That is why my title, The Degradation of the 
International Legal Order? has a question mark – and why it is followed by a pointer 
to the ‘rehabilitation of law’ and the ‘possibility of politics’. It is not the principles 
concerned which could be said to have undergone a process of degradation, but the 
real achievements of struggle in transforming international law.  
Rather than lumping together the ‘active struggle of the USSR and the Third World’ 
as Know suggests
10
, I show, in Chapter 1 of my book, and my chapter in the 2008 
Susan Marks collection, how the USSR played a thoroughly contradictory, indeed 
schizophrenic role after Lenin’s death. On the one hand self-determination 
movements were ruthlessly repressed both within the USSR and its sphere of interest; 
on the other, huge diplomatic and material resources were directed to the anti-colonial 
and national liberation movements – and to the real struggle to elevate the right of 
peoples to self-determination to the status of a right in international law in the United 
Nations human rights covenants, in 1960, 1966 and 1970. 
What was missing from my book and from my Susan Marks chapter was Issa Shivji’s 
splendid critique of Soviet practice. I had most certainly read this in 1992, but had 
forgotten it by 2007. 
Shivji is one of the most radical African specialists in law and the constitution. His 
Concept of Human Rights in Africa
11
 is a fine exposé of the malign influence of 
western individualised human rights in Africa. In his 1991 contribution to William 
Twining’s Aberdeen collection12 he was perfectly clear that the comprehensive 
theorisation of the ‘right to self-determination’ was carried out by Lenin, and was put 
into practice in the 1918 Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People
13
 
which proclaimed complete independence of Finland, evacuation of troops from 
Persia, and freedom of self-determination for Armenia. Self-determination only 
appeared in the UN Charter (as a principle, not a right) at the insistence of the Soviet 
delegation.
14
  
As for its application in Africa, Shivji refers to an important passage from the October 
1917 Decree on Peace, drafted by Lenin.
15
 
In accordance with the sense of justice of democrats in general, and of the 
working class in particular, the government conceives the annexation of 
seizure of foreign lands to mean every incorporation of a small or weak nation 
into large or powerful state without the precisely, clearly, and voluntarily 
expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time when such 
forcible incorporation took place, irrespective also of the degree of 
development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed to the given 
state, or forcibly retained within its borders, and irrespective, finally, of 
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whether this nation is in Europe or in distant, overseas countries. 
Lenin, therefore, was for self-determination everywhere, including the Russian 
Empire and indeed the whole of Europe. I have no doubt he would have supported the 
Basques, the Kurds, the Chechens, and the Palestinians – as well as the Irish. 
Shivji argues, quite correctly, that Soviet practice following World War II was 
consistently to apply only one aspect of Lenin’s proposition, that is, formation of 
states by formerly colonised people – but otherwise resolutely to uphold, in the most 
conservative manner, the doctrines of territorial integrity, state sovereignty and non-
intervention. This is the rigid positivism to which I refer in my chapter for Susan 
Marks’ collection.16 
For Lenin, however, self-determination was a continuing right, and could be invoked 
at any time by an oppressed nation even in a sovereign state. Shivji continued: ‘the 
problem in Africa has been precisely that the existing states have not treated nations 
and minorities under them democratically, hence their fear that the recognition of this 
‘right’ will lead to secession.’17 
Shivji applied this analysis to Ethiopia/Eritrea and to Southern Sudan. He argued 
forcefully that state practice in Africa had isolated and absolutised only one element 
in the right, the element of anti-colonialism. This had ‘robbed the right of self-
determination of its fundamental defining characteristic, anti-imperialism.’18 He 
concluded: 
… the right to self-determination is a collective right. It is a continuing right, 
‘a right that keeps its validity even after a people has chosen a certain form of 
government or a certain international status’19 . The right-holders in the right 
to self-determination are dominated/exploitation people and oppressed nations, 
nationalities, national groups and minorities identifiable specifically in each 
concrete situation.”20 
It was only a shame that Makau wa Mutua in his passionate 1995 article Why Redraw 
the Map of Africa?
21
 did not refer – in his section III entitled ‘The National Question 
and Self-Determination: Prospects for Alternative Formulae’22 to Shivji’s work at all, 
but only to the much more conservative and orthodox account by Abdullahi An-
Na’im in Shivji’s own collection, also published in 1991 .23 
The absence of indeterminacy? 
Furthermore, Knox takes me to task for neglecting the debate on ‘legal 
indeterminacy’.24 To which, in part, I plead guilty. The ‘indeterminacy thesis’ holds 
that ‘in any given case – legal argument can serve to justify any outcome.’ Knox cites 
Koskenniemi, as arguing that ‘the law constantly oscillates between the two mutually 
opposed poles of sovereignty and world order.’  
In fact, at the page cited by Knox
25
, Koskenniemi explains that there are two ways of 
arguing about order and obligation in international law. The first ‘traces them down to 
                                                 
16 See Bowring 2008a  
17 Shivji 1991a 35 
18 Shivji 1991a 37 
19 See Cassese  150 
20
 Shivji 1991a 43 
21 Wa Mutua 1995  
22
 Wa Mutua 1995, 1150 
23
 An-Na’im 1991 101-102  
24 Knox, 197 
25 Koskenniemi 2005, 59 
 5 
justice, common interests, progress… anterior or superior to State behaviour… 
Another argument bases order and obligation on State behaviour, will or interest…’. 
Which may not be quite the same thing.  
My own take on this thesis, which I have put to Koskenniemi himself – he seemed to 
agree - is that writing as he does from the twin perspectives of scholar and 
practitioner, indeterminacy properly applies to the process of international litigation. 
As he puts it, ‘The politics of international law is what competent international 
lawyers do. And competence is the ability to use grammar in order to generate 
meaning by doing things in argument.’26 (his emphasis) Thus, the lawyers on each 
side of a case, and the judge(s), have in common their membership of an epistemic 
community, users of the language that must be used in order to participate in the 
process at all. Both sides advance the most convincing – and competent – argument 
they can. And the outcome is wholly indeterminate – the case can go either way. 
Otherwise, there would be no point in litigating. Koskenniemi also pointed out that 
‘the other ambition in From Apology to Utopia looked beyond description. It was to 
provide resources for the use of international law’s professional vocabulary for 
critical or emancipatory causes.’27 I have no problem with either of these propositions. 
The first describes what I do when I and my colleagues argue a case at the European 
Court of Human Rights. The second is what I try to do in my own book, on the basis 
of a thoroughly materialist and historicised account of international law – and its 
revolutionary kernel. As Koskenniemi himself freely admits, he is not a Marxist. But 
he combines the experience of practice with a fine critical scepticism as to 
international law. And it is no surprise to me that competent scholars of international 
law are well able to argue a position which is the opposite of the one I take. For me, 
the historical outcome will be determined by politics, not by doctrine; and for that 
very reason is entirely indeterminate. We do not know which side will win. 
Immediately following his criticism as to indeterminacy, Knox charges me with 
silence as to the invocation [of self-determination] by various imperialist powers.
28
 He 
cites the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and states that Russia invaded Georgia ‘under the 
rationale (amongst others) of defending the right to self-determination of Abkhazia’s 
ethnic Russians.’ This is simply not the case.29 It is now firmly established30 that 
Georgia started the conflict by attacking Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, 
which is part of Georgian territory, but broke away in 1991. Russia’s response was a 
brutal counter-attack in defence of its own peacekeepers and the many Ossetians who 
hold Russian citizenship. Abkhazia was not the issue.  
However, in my view the Abkhazian people most certainly have a right to self-
determination. Its people are Circassians, against whom the Russian Empire 
committed genocide in the 1800s. The Circassians will be making this point forcefully 
at the Russians’ Winter Olympics at Sochi, the site of the massacres. The Abkhaz 
language is quite unrelated to Georgian; Abkhazia had a long history as a kingdom 
and a principality; and had autonomous status in the USSR. The Abkhazians 
committed ethnic cleansing against the Georgian population of Abkhazia; but their 
claim to self-determination still has merit. Like every form of words – of discourse – 
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the phrase ‘the right to self-determination’ can be picked up and abused by any party 
to a conflict. But I maintain that its origins are to be found in Marx and Engels, as I 
show below; and it was developed as an integral part of revolutionary Marxism by V I 
Lenin, and played the crucial role in the development of international law after WWII. 
 
The Pashukanis debate 
However, as with his Law and Disorder review
31, the nub of Knox’s critique concerns 
Yevgeny Pashukanis. Knox rightly reproaches me for ignoring Yevgeny Pashukanis’ 
important text Lenin and Problems of Law.
32
 According to Knox, in Law and 
Disorder, ‘This is the main text in which Pashukanis attempts to outline a specifically 
Marxist approach to legal strategy. For this reason I have always found it rather odd 
that it is never mentioned in the contemporary debates.’  I admit that I had not read it; 
but I have now. 
In my book, I argued that Pashukanis missed the significance of self-determination.
33
 
Indeed, I asserted that ‘Pasukanis was incapable of recognising the significance of 
self-determination for international law’34 – that is, its significance for the imperialist 
and colonial systems. Knox answered me, in his Law and Disorder review, as 
follows: ‘… Pashukanis takes self-determination seriously.’ By this he means that in 
the final part, V, of Lenin and Problems of Law
35
 Pashukanis does indeed discuss 
self-determination, and this I had missed – so I am very grateful to Knox, and pay 
tribute to his scholarship.  
In his Law and Disorder review, Knox insisted that for Lenin the demand for the right 
of nations to self-determination was an ‘‘abstract’, ‘negative’ demand of formal equal 
rights.’ In the context of Russian absolutism, the abstract formal equality of right was 
a revolutionary demand.  Knox then turned to Pashukanis’ argument that this right 
though is ultimately limited precisely because it remains within a legal, and therefore 
capitalist framework, therefore in a new concrete conjuncture: 
This was a new stage, a new situation, a new and higher level of struggle. And new priorities 
corresponded to it. The bourgeois-democratic stage had passed, and with it the formal legal 
demand for national self-determination - characteristic of this stage - lost its former 
significance. The slogan ‘overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie on a world scale and set up the 
international dictatorship of the proletariat’ became the immediate practical slogan. Does this 
mean that national self determination lost all significance; that it could be replaced with the 
"self determination of the proletariat"?' Certainly not. This would have been to ignore the 
presence of backward countries which had not passed through the stage of bourgeois 
democratic national revolutions. The communist proletariat of advanced countries had to 
support these movements; with all its strength it had to struggle so that the accumulation of 
centuries of ill will and the distrust by backward people of the dominant nations – and of the 
proletariat of these nations – was overcome as quickly as possible. It was impossible to 
achieve this goal without proclaiming and conducting in practice the right of national self-
determination. Moreover, even for a socialist society moving towards the elimination of 
classes the question of national self-determination still remains a real one, since although 
based on economics, socialism by no means consists solely of economics.
36
 
 
We should recall what Pashukanis said a few pages earlier. He reported that Lenin’s 
opponents – especially Rosa Luxemburg - had argued against the ‘right to self-
                                                 
31
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 7 
determination’ ‘under the pretext that ‘in essence’ no ‘self-determination could exist 
under capitalism, and that under socialism it was not necessary.’37 Lenin’s position as 
stated in 1916, correctly reported by Pashukanis, was that ‘The dispute is related to 
one of the forms of political oppression, namely, the forceful domination of one 
nation by the state of another nation. This is simply an attempt to avoid political 
questions.’38 But Pashukanis went on to state that no-one apart from him had noted 
that Luxemburg’s position amounted to a ‘complete rejection of the legal form’.39 
Pashukanis then cited a longer passage from Lenin’s 1914 major work on The Right of 
Nations to Self-Determination.  
By the way, it is not difficult to see why, from a Social-Democratic point of view, the right to 
‘self-determination’ means neither federation nor autonomy (a though, speaking in the 
abstract, both come under the category of ‘self-determination’). The right to federation is 
simply meaningless, since federation implies a bilateral contract. It goes without saying that 
Marxists cannot include the defence of federalism in general in their programme. As far as 
autonomy is concerned, Marxists defend, not the ‘right’ to autonomy, but autonomy itself, as a 
general universal principle of a democratic state with a mixed national composition, and a 
great variety of geographical and other conditions. Consequently, the recognition of the ‘right 
of nations to autonomy’ is as absurd as that of the ‘right of nations to federation’ 
The effect of this citation, out of context, is to render wholly obscure that which is 
actually quite clear. 
 
Ignoring Marx and Lenin on Ireland? 
 
It appears to me that Pashukanis took this passage completely out of context. It is 
actually one of Lenin’s footnotes to Chapter 8 of the work in question, ‘The Utopian 
Karl Marx and the Practical Rosa Luxemburg’. Lenin was attacking Luxemburg’s 
position that to call for Polish independence is ‘utopia’. She asked, ironically as she 
thought: why not raise the same demand for Ireland? This led Lenin straight to Marx’ 
highly principled stand on Ireland. At first, prior to the 1860s, Marx had thought that 
Ireland ‘would not be liberated by the national movement of the oppressed nation, but 
by the working-class movement of the oppressor nation.’ Lenin pointed out: 
However, it so happened that the English working class fell under the influence of the liberals 
for a fairly long time, became an appendage to the liberals, and by adopting a liberal-labour 
policy left itself leaderless. The bourgeois liberation movement in Ireland grew stronger and 
assumed revolutionary forms. Marx reconsidered his view and corrected it. 
Lenin cited the following passage. In his letter to Engels on 2 November 1867 Marx 
wrote: 
The Fenian trial in Manchester was exactly as was to be expected. You will have seen what a 
scandal ‘our people’ have caused in the Reform League. I sought by every means at my 
disposal to incite the English workers to demonstrate in favour of Fenianism…. I once 
believed the separation of Ireland from England to be impossible. I now regard it as inevitable, 
although Federation may follow upon separation.
40
 
The trial in question was that of the ‘Manchester martyrs’ - William Philip Allen, 
Michael Larkin, and Michael O'Brien - who were members of the Irish Republican 
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Brotherhood. The men were executed after having been found guilty of the murder of 
a police officer during an escape that took place close to Manchester city centre 
in1867.
41
 
That is, Marx was, in the words of the contemporary UK Terrorism Act 2006, 
‘glorifying terrorism’, and terrorism committed by bourgeois nationalists at that. He 
would now face a stiff sentence. 
Once Pashukanis’ quotation is placed in context, it is plain that Pashukanis had 
wholly misunderstood both Lenin and Marx. And influenced as he is by Pashukanis, 
Knox has also, it appears to me, misunderstood. The issue at stake between Lenin and 
Luxemburg was, as I point out in my book and chapter, whether the component parts 
of the Russian Empire should have the right to self-determination and to break away 
to form new sovereign nations. Luxemburg was convinced that the Empire should be 
preserved, and was as opposed to Polish liberation as she was to Irish liberation. 
In my book I show in detail how Lenin put his theory into practice immediately 
following the Bolshevik victory, supporting the independence of Finland, the three 
Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - and Poland.  His last struggle was with 
Stalin: Lenin, on principle supported Georgian independence, even under a 
Menshevik government- Stalin was totally opposed.
42
 Lenin’s creativity was key to 
the struggles of the National Liberation Movements after World War II.
43
 
Karl Marx on self-determination 
I have to revise in another respect the position maintained in my book, as to Lenin’s 
role as progenitor of the ‘right of nations to self-determination’. I note that Marx 
himself used the term ‘self-determination’ on at least two occasions, in a political 
rather than a philosophical context. In his letter of 20 November 1865 to Hermann 
Jung
44
, Marx referred, under the heading ‘International Politics’, to ‘The need to 
eliminate Muscovite influence in Europe by applying the right of self-determination 
of nations, and the re-establishment of Poland upon a democratic and social basis.’ 
Furthermore, in a speech on Poland delivered on 24 March 1875
45
, he declared: 
What are the reasons for this special interest of the workers' party in the fate of Poland? First 
of all, of course, sympathy for a subjugated people which, with its incessant and heroic 
struggle against its oppressors, has proven its historic right to national autonomy and self-
determination. It is not in the least a contradiction that the international workers' party strives 
for the creation of the Polish nation. 
No doubt Pashukanis would have sought to put a different spin on that passage. 
The Afro-American Marxist scholar August Nimtz has addressed the ‘myth’ of 
Marx’s Eurocentrism, as he describes it.46  He shows how, from 1870 onwards, Marx 
and Engels ceased to expect the rebirth of a revolutionary movement in England, 
following the demise of the Chartists. Instead, they turned to Russia as the 
revolutionary vanguard. This was ‘an overwhelmingly peasant country that had only 
one foot in Europe, and not the Europe that the Eurocentric charge refers to, that is, its 
most developed western flank.’47 
But as early as 1849, they urged that: 
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Only a world war can break old England, as only this can provide the Chartists, the party of 
the organized English workers, with the conditions for a successful rising against their 
powerful oppressors. Only when the Chartists head the English government will the social 
revolution pass from the sphere of utopia to that of reality. But any European war in which 
England is involved is a world war, waged in Canada and Italy, in the East Indies and Prussia, 
in Africa and on the Danube.
48
 
Nimtz shows how Marx and Engels reversed their earlier position and gave support to 
religious-led Arab resistance to French imperialism in Algeria in 1857; expressed 
strong sympathy for the Sepoy Mutiny against Britain in India in 1857-9; and by 1861 
wrote, as the US Civil War loomed, that US expansion into Texas and what is now 
Arizona and New Mexico, brought with it slavery and the rule of the slaveholders.
49
 
At the same time, they were quite clear that the ‘booty of British imperialism’ had 
begun to corrupt and compromise the English proletariat.
50
  
Pranav Jani in turn focuses on Marx’s response to the 1857 revolt in British India.51 
He maintains that ‘under the impact of the Revolt, Marx’s articles increasingly turned 
from an exclusive focus on the British Bourgeoisie to theorise the self-activity and 
struggle of the colonised Indians.’52 Jani seeks to show how Marx’s historical-
materialist methodology allowed him to transcend weak formulations and prejudices 
to achieve a more complex understanding of the relation between coloniser and 
colonised, in much the same way as the Paris Commune forced him to re-assess his 
theory of the State.
53
 For Jani, Marx was thereby transformed from a ‘mere observer’ 
of the anti-colonial struggle to an active participant in the ideological struggle over 
the meaning of the Revolt. This enabled him also to refute racist representations of 
Indian violence in the British press ‘by drawing a sharp division between the violence 
of the oppressed and that of the oppressor and dialectically linking the two.’54 Jani 
concludes that if Eurocentrism makes Western Europe the centre of the globe, then 
the Marx he presents is not Eurocentric. 
And Marx is the progenitor of the revolutionary sense of self-determination which I 
celebrate in my book. 
Knox cites Rajgopal with approval.
55
 Yet I am perplexed by Rajgopal’s contribution 
to the collection International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice
56
. He at 
any rate acknowledges (drawing on Morsink
57
) that Britain engaged in intense 
manoeuvring during the drafting of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 to prevent Soviet pressure from extending the effect of the right to self-
determination to the colonies.
58
 This did not happen until 1966, following a 
tremendous diplomatic effort by the USSR and its allies. On the following page, 
however, he cites Michael Iganatieff, of all people, as authority for the utterly false 
proposition that the idea of self-determination was the result of the anti-colonial revolt 
against empire.
59
 It was the other way round entirely: the right to self-determination as 
developed by Lenin became the rallying cry of the colonial revolt.  
                                                 
48 Marx 1849  
49 Nimtz 2002, 68-69 
50
 Nimtz 2002, 71 
51 Jani 2002  
52
 Jani 2002, 82 
53
 Jani 2002, 83 
54
 Jani 2002, 90-91 
55 Knox 2010, 204 
56
 Falk, 2008  
57
 Morsink 1999 
58
 Rajagopal 2008, 65 
59
 Rajagopal 2008, 66 
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In the same collection, Vasuki Nesiah, in a flood of unbridled idealism, seeks to 
persuade us that self-determination has failed – as a discourse. He declares that ‘the 
failure of self-determination discourse is partly grounded in the invocation of ‘self-
determination’ as a trans-historical signifier – a timeless ground for the post-colonial 
imagination.’60 Whatever that means. 
Conclusion 
It will have been noted that Knox’s careful critique has required me to revise my own 
position in a number of respects. He has pointed out serious gaps in my account, and 
has spurred me to carry out further investigation. However, to my project of 
‘revolutionary conservatism’, he would be inclined to a type of ‘principled 
opportunism’. I am not sure I agree. Yet in his final paragraph61 he is kind enough to 
describe my book as ‘an excellent contribution to the growing debate on Marxist 
approaches to international law.’ That gives me every reason to look forward to 
fruitful collaboration with one of the most talented Marxist scholars of the new 
generation. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Nesiah 2008, 214   
61 Knox 2010, 205 
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